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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
THE REPUBLIC GROUP, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 920330-CA

WON-DOOR CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
REED A. WATKINS, JAY A. SMART,
RON SMART, and DOES 1 THROUGH 20,

Argument Priority

Defendants-Respondents.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Richard A. Rappaport, (Bar No. 2690)
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Respondents/
Petitioners Jay and Ron Smart

Richard K. Crandall
340 East 100 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0600
and

Jeffrey M. Jones (Bar No. 1741)
Paul M. Durham (Bar No. 0939)
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES
50 South Main Street, Suite 850
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Telephone: (801) 538-2424
Attorneys for Respondent/
Petitioner Won-Door Corporation

Robert G. Norton
925 E. Executive Park, Ste. D
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The Republic Group, Inc.

Defendants/Respondents, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
hereby petition the Court of Appeals for rehearing with respect to the following points of law
and points of fact which Petitioners claim the Court has overlooked and/or misapprehended in
its September 7, 1994 Opinion in this case.
SECTION I
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHAT
THE PARTIES MEANT IN THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT
BY "LEUCADIA (OR ANY OF THE OTHER
QUALIFIED TEN LISTED COMPANIES)"
Based upon Appellant's unsupported arguments,1 this Court has concluded (1) that
the August 22 Agreement is ambiguous on its face as to what the parties meant when they
referenced "Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed companies)," and (2) that there is
a factual dispute as to what the parties intended by using the phrase "Leucadia (or any of the
other qualified ten listed companies)" in the August 22 Agreement.2 (September 7, 1994

1

Appellant has represented in its Brief on Appeal at p. 26 that:
...[I]t is undisputed that there is, in fact, no list often companies. Secondly, it
is also undisputed that no where [sic] on the face of either the August 22
Agreement or the May 21 letter is there anything tying these two documents
together. Nor is there anything in Parry's letter to Watkins tying the phrase "list
often companies" to the May 21 list. Nor, contrary to Defendant's suggestion
to the District Court, was the May 21, 1988 letter or any other list of ten
companies ever attached or in any other way incorporated as a part of the August
22, contract.

2

The August 22, 1986 Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit "1" in Appendix I, states in
its recitals:
Agreement dated 8-22-86 between Republic Group & Won-Door
Corporation, through Reed A. Watkins, Re: fee due former if Leucadia (or any
of the other qualified ten listed companies) acquires an interest in Won-Door.
[emphasis added].
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Opinion, p. 15). Petitioner respectfully submits that the record in this case contradicts these
conclusions.

First of all, the August 22 Agreement was not ambiguous when it referenced

"Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed companies)." The August 22 Agreement was
a two-page document. The first page was hand-written. The second page was the May 21st
letter which specifically listed Leucadia and ten other companies. Appellant's own verified
pleadings and the sworn testimony of its president prove that the August 22 Agreement was a
two-page document. And secondly, resort to extrinsic evidence reveals no factual dispute as to
what the parties intended by "Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed companies)."
A.

THE MAY 21. 1986 LETTER LISTING LEUCADIA AND THE OTHER TEN
QUALIFIED COMPANIES WAS THE SECOND PAGE OF THE AUGUST 22.
1986 AGREEMENT. AND. AS A RESULT. THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT
WAS NOT AMBIGIOUS. AS A MATTER OF LAW.
While Appellant argues that there is no evidence that the August 22 Agreement

was a two-page document, Appellant's argument ignores undisputed evidence which Appellant
itself introduced into the record. The August 22 Agreement undisputedly contained two pages,
the second of which was the May 21 letter. Petitioner respectfully calls the Court's attention
to the following three evidentiary items:
1.

In paragraph 24 of its Verified Complaint, Appellant states:
24. Watkins met with plaintiff on or about August 22, 1986, after
negotiations with TSI had commenced, and at the insistence of defendants
reduced the Finder Fee Agreement to writing, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated hereby by this reference.

(R. 000007).3 Exhibit "E" to the Verified Complaint is the August 22 Agreement, a two-page
document.

3

The first page of the August 22 Agreement is handwritten.

The second is the

Referenced pages from the Verified Complaint are attached hereto in Appendix III.
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attachment to that agreement, i.e., a copy of the May 21, 1986 letter/

Since Appellant has

sworn under oath in the very first pleading filed in this case that the May 21, 1986 letter was
the attachment to the August 22 Agreement, it is incredulous that Appellant has argued in its
brief on appeal that there is no evidence suggesting that the May 21 letter was ever attached or
incorporated as a part of the August 22 Agreement, (p. 26, Appellant's Brief on Appeal).
2.

Mr. Irvin D. Bird, Jr., president of the Appellant corporation, verified the

Complaint under oath. Confirming his sworn statements in that document, Mr. Bird testified
in his deposition that the May 21, 1986 letter was attached to and a part of the August 22
Agreement. At page 79 of his deposition, Mr. Bird identified the August 22 Agreement and its
attached May 21, 1986 letter as Exhibit "6" to the deposition.5 Clearly Mr. Bird understood
that the May 21, 1986 letter was an attachment to the August 22 Agreement.
3.

In responding to questions regarding Exhibit "6" to his deposition, i.e.,

the August 22 Agreement, Mr. Bird specifically testified that the language "Leucadia (or any
of the other qualified ten companies)" to which the August 22 Agreement made reference was
the list set out in the second page of the agreement itself:
Q: Now, [the August 22 Agreement] goes on to state, "Re: fee due
former-" and that's The Republic Group; that's as you understand it,
right?
A: Yes,
Q: [quoting the August 22 Agreement] "If Leucadia (or any of the
other qualified ten companies) acquires an interest in Won-Door," right?

4

Exhibit "E" to the Verified Complaint is located in the record at R. 000021-000022.

Petitioners have attached that document hereto as Exhibit "1" in Appendix I.
5

Referenced pages of Mr. Bird's deposition are attached hereto in Appendix II.
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A: That's correct.
Q: Okay, and Leucadia and the other qualified ten listed
companies are those ones listed on the second page [the May 21, 1986
letter] right?
A: They are.
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 81. This undisputed testimony unqualifiedly
identifies the "other qualified ten listed companies" (besides Leucadia) to which the August 22
Agreement made reference.6
Thus, Petitioners respectfully submit that while Appellant argues that there is no
evidence tying together the August 22 Agreement with the May 21, 1986 letter, Appellant is
plainly wrong, based upon the undisputed sworn statements and testimony of its own president.
The August 22 Agreement with its attachment is not ambiguous, and as a matter of law should
be enforced according to its terms. (See Appellant's Brief on Appeal, pps. 26-31, 33-41)
B.

EVEN IF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WERE NECESSARY, THE UNDISPUTED
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT AND ITS VERIFIED
COMPLAINT SHOW THAT THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL
FACT AS TO WHAT THE PARTIES INTENDED BY THE PHRASE
"LEUCADIA (OR ANY OF THE OTHER QUALIFIED TEN LISTED
COMPANIES)".
If resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions is necessary, Appellant's

sworn statements in both its Verified Complaint and in the deposition of its president

6

It must be remembered that the phrase "Leucadia or any of the other qualified ten listed
companies" was first drafted by Appellant's attorney in his August 20, 1994 letter to Reed
Watkins, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "2" in Appendix I. In that letter,
Appellant was requesting that a fee agreement be entered into with respect to Leucadia and the
other qualified ten listed companies. For Appellant, whose attorney coined the language, to now
say that it doesn't know what that language references is belied by Appellant's Verified
Complaint, the testimony of its own president, and common sense.
-5-

undisputedly indicate that the parties intended the phrase, "Leucadia (or any of the other
qualified ten listed companies)" to refer to the May 21, 1986 letter. Mr. Bird's deposition
testimony cited above is crystal clear.
In fact, the record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary. Appellant cannot
and has not pointed to any list of "Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed companies)"
other than the May 21st letter to which the parties could possibly have been making reference.
The only other list that was ever circulated between the parties was the May 27 list, and that
one contained 15 names and included Thermal Systems, Inc. But Appellant has acknowledged
that in signing the August 22 Agreement, it excluded Thermal Systems, Inc. from the list of
qualified companies:
27. On August 22, 1986, plaintiff was unaware that its introduction of
Won-Door Corporation to [Thermal Systems, Inc.J7 had resulted in negotiations,
and in reliance upon the representations of Watkins and in ignorance of the true
situation relating to [Thermal Systems, Inc.], executed the second Fee Agreement
excluding [Thermal Systems. Inc. 1 from the list of qualified companies upon which
it would be entitled to a finders fee in the event of a successful sale, [emphasis
added].
Appellant's Verified Complaint, par. 27 (R. 00008). Thus, the May 27th list could not possibly
have been the list to which the parties made reference by their use of the phrase "Leucadia (or
any of the other qualified ten listed companies)".8 That list contained Thermal Systems, Inc.
and had fifteen, not ten additional names. Nor does the May 27th list include Leucadia. The

7

In paragraph 15 of the Verified Complaint at R. 000005, Appellant defined Thermal
Systems, Inc. as "TSI".
8

Quite frankly, if the only issue in this case were what constituted the "list of ten" to which
the August 22 Agreement made reference, Appellant's admission that TSI was not on that list
is determinative of whether Appellant was entitled to a finders fee for locating TSI.
-6-

extrinsic evidence undisputedly proves that the only list to which the August 22 Agreement could
have been making reference is the one included in the May 21st letter.
C.

THIS COURT SHOULD CONFIRM THE TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT
THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT. AS A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
STATEMENT OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT. CONTROLLED THEIR
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP.
Apparently the Court relied on Appellant's erroneous and inaccurate statements

regarding the record when it ruled that the August 22 Agreement was ambigious and that there
was disputed evidence regarding the phrase "Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed
companies)."9 But the record speaks for itself. The sworn admissions of Appellant in its
Verified Complaint, the exhibits thereto, and the deposition testimony of Appellant's president
are conclusive on this issue. As a matter of law, there is no genuine issue of material fact with
respect to what the parties intended. The trial court's ruling that the August 22 Agreement was
the contract controlling the parties' relationship should be affirmed.
SECTION II
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER
THERE WAS A FEE AGREEMENT IN PLACE
AT THE TIME OF PETITIONERS' ALLEGED BREACH
OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
The Court has raised the issue as to whether there was a fee agreement in place
prior to August 22, either by modification of the March 12 agreement or by the parties having
entered into a new contract. Petitioners submit that the undisputed evidence is that no fee

9

The Court also relied on Appellant's false statements in its brief, unsupported by citation
to the record, that the May 21, 1986 letter was never given to Boettcher. Appellant's Brief, p.
9. In fact, Reed Watkins's December 28, 1990 Affidavit states that the letter was given to
Boettcher. That testimony is undisputed. (R. 000300. Mr. Watkins's Affidavit is contained
in Appendix IV hereto).
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agreement was in place, and that the Appellant's allegations that there was a contract for a
"reasonable fee" fail as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear in
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988), that courts cannot engage in
determining what is or is not "reasonable rent" because courts simply are not equipped to make
such decisions and should not "impose paternalistic agreements on litigants." Id. at 502.
A key element of this Court's decision is its holding that a reasonable fee could
be determined and inferred from the factual circumstances, rejecting Petitioners' analysis of
Pingree v.Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 588 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).10 However, in the
Cottonwood Mall case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted Pingree broadly, making
it clear that courts are not to determine what constitutes a reasonable rent. In Cottonwood Mall,
the defendant had purchased the outstanding stock of a bowling alley after multiple oral
assurances from the landlord of the bowling alley that it would be willing to renew the lease at
a "reasonable rent." After he purchased the bowling alley, the defendant expended $10,000 to
$20,000 improving and remodeling the leased space based upon additional representations from
the landlord that he would "renew the lease on reasonable terms at or about the time the present
lease would expire." Id. at 500. After lengthy negotiations, the landlord ultimately refused to
renew the lease and brought an eviction action. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
judgment in favor of the landlord, finding that the landlord's repeated promises and the parties'
agreement that a "reasonable rent" would be charged upon renewal were too indefinite to
enforce.

Court's September 7, 1994 Opinion, pp. 8-9.
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Defendant argues that in Pmgree, the court declined to fix the renewal rent
because of the difficulty in balancing the several factors which the lease required
the parties to consider in fixing the rent. Here, defendant's argument continues,
no factors are listed in the lease and the task is less complicated. We do not
agree, [emphasis added].
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 767 P.2d at 502. The Supreme Court went on to explain why
courts should not make an agreement for the parties based upon some standard or factor of
reasonableness:
In determining what is "reasonable rent," many factors must be weighed and put
into the equation. Business judgments must be made. Horman testified that he
would not negotiate a new lease at the time Sine's real estate agents approached
him because of inflation and instability in the commercial leasing market. He
was unwilling to enter into another lease, either long term or short term, unless
he could consider the costs of operating and owing the building as they compared
to the amount of rent received. He only indicated that he would be willing to
enter into a new lease at a reasonable figure and at the appropriate time. Courts
simply are not equipped to make monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating
commercial world and are even less prepared to impose paternalistic agreements
on litigants, [emphasis added]
Id. at 502. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded, the trial court acted properly in not
writing the contract by telling what the parties what the reasonable rent would be.
In determining whether the parties in this case entered into any enforceable
modification, the undisputed record is determinative. Appellant has undisputedly acknowledged
that by May 1986 it was not operating under the March 12 Agreement. The testimony of all of
the parties is clear that the March 12 Agreement covered the parties relationship for only 22%
of the stock, not for 100%. Appellant's president even testified that the document became
obsolete when Won-Door began looking for a 100% buyer:
A. . . . In fact, this document became very obsolete. This was a
document where we defined a 22 percent investor in Won-Door which we were to
be paid $250,000. This document became obsolete when it was determined that

-9-

Won-Door would entertain a sale for the entire corporation, and at that point we
no longer worked on this document. . . .
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 19. Mr. Bird reaffirmed that testimony later in his
deposition:
Q. You said you brought someone in April or May to Mr. Watkins that
would perform the formula or buy that smaller percentage of Won-Door. Who
was that?
A. Mr. James Volker, and that was well after we were into merger
discussions with others. I called Reed and specifically asked him. I said, Reed,
I know we 're not working under this deal any more. I know—
Q. By that you mean [the March 12 Agreement]?
A. Selling 22 percent as defined in [the March 12 Agreement], that we
were not looking for a full merger partner.
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 21. Mr. Bird went on to acknowledge that while the
discussions with Mr. Volker were covered by the March 12 Agreement, that was the only
activity under the March 12 Agreement that occurred after a decision was made to sell 100%
of the corporation. Id. at p. 22.
It is undisputed that by May 1986, Appellant had determined that it could not
obtain an investor for only 22 percent of the stock, as was required by the March 12 Agreement:
Q. So Republic Group started at the latter part of February '86 and then
well into May before the Republic Group determined that it couldn't get an
investor for the 22 percent?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 16.
The fact that Appellant could not perform under the terms of the March 12
Agreement was communicated to Petitioners starting in at least April:

-10-

A. . . . Our activity mainly changed from this emphasis [the March 12
Agreement] very shortly after this to finding a full merger partner.
Q. Would that have been in May when that happened?
A. That would have been in April, starting in April Reed and I had a
number of meetings during this period of January, February, March and April
relating to this almost on a daily basis, as a matter offact, and I made it known
to him that it was our opinion hat The Republic Group, that an investment of this
kind in a private corporation was just an impossible thins to do. [emphasis
added].
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at pp. 17-18. Mr. Bird explained Appellant's inability to
perform as follows:
A. . . . I think we have to clarify the fact that we determined at The
Republic Group in our discussions in-house that a $7 million private placement
in a private corporation in a minority interest could not be accomplished.
Unfortunately, I can't remember the names of several people that we talked to
Reed about that, but at that time we talked to them we told them that in our
opinion a minority interest in a privately owned corporation we could not fund,
[emphasis added].
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 15.
Undisputedly, by May 1986, Appellant could not perform its obligations under
the March 12 Agreement. Thus, the only contract in August 1986 of which Appellants could
possibly complain was either a new contract or a modification of the March 12 Agreement. The
Court acknowledges this argument on p. 5 of its opinion where it states,
If the trial court could determine as a matter of law on the undisputed facts that
the parties had, orally or by conduct, rescinded or otherwise terminated the
March 12 agreement without entering into a new agreement, then no contract was
in place and no covenant of good faith and fair dealing existed at the time of the
alleged breach. If, on the other hand, the facts could support a finding that the
parties either modified the March 12 agreement or terminated the March 12
agreement and entered into a new one, then a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing may have been in effect.
Court of Appeals' 9/7/94 Opinion at p. 5.
-11-

While parties to contract may modify, waive or make new contractual terms, the
minds of the parties must have met upon any asserted contract modification. Provo City Corp.
v. Nielson Scott Co., 604 P.2d. 803, 806 (Utah 1979).

If the modification is too vague and

indefinite, it will not be enforcable. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah
1988). The evidence in this case is clear that there was no contract between the parties prior
to August 22.
Prior to August 22, any alleged contract between the parties was too indefinite
to be enforced. The parties did not agree upon which contacts would result in a fee being paid.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8). The parties did not decide on a fee.

Id.

Prior to August 22,

according to Appellant, it was extremely upset that there was no fee agreement:
So at a meeting on the 20th of August my partners Bryant Gragun—my
associates, not partners-my associates, Mark McSwain, Fred Volcansec, all
drafted letters to be written. And I thought they were all too harsh, so I asked
Mr. Doug Parry to write a letter saying that we knew that tomorrow or the next
day there was going to be an offer made for cash and we had no fee agreement;
and we demanded, absolutely demanded a fee agreement or we would make sure
that the offer wasn't forthcoming, and we'd had that discussion with Leucadia.
And so this letter was written in an attempt to get some kind of a comprehensive
agreement together listing all of the companies that we had brought, [emphasis
added].
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 65.
The case before this Court is directly analogous to Cottonwood Mall. As in that case,
according to Appellant in this case, there was an agreement for a "reasonable fee."11 Prior to
August 22, the parties had not decided on what constituted a reasonable fee. Nor, according to

11

Paragraph 28 of Appellant's Verified Complaint alleges only that the agreement between
the parties provided that Appellant "would be paid a reasonable fee upon the closing of the TSI
transaction." (R. 000008).
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Appellant, had the parties agreed upon which contacts would result in a fee being paid. Thus,
prior to August 22, the alleged "contract" was far too indefinite to enforce.12 Frankly, while
Petitioners disagree with the Court's assessment that there are issues of fact remaining as to
Appellant's fraud claim, that remedy is the only one available to Appellants. While Appellants
could recover (if the facts supported the claim) for being defrauded into signing the August 22
Agreement, they cannot ask the Court to enforce the negotiations that led up to the August 22
Agreement. Until that document was signed, as a matter of law there was no agreement between
the parties sufficiently definite to have been enforced.
As a matter of law as enunciated in Cottonwood Mali, there was no meeting of
minds with respect to a modification of the March 12 Agreement or any new contract until
August 22. The lack of agreement regarding (a) the fee arrangement, and (b) which companies
were covered by the agreement prevents enforcement of an indefinitely vague contract.
Therefore, there could be no breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners believe that the Court's September 7, 1994 Opinion in this case has
overlooked and/or misapprehended the points of law and points of facts set forth in this Petition.
Therefore, Petitioners request the Court to review the record and the Supreme Court's opinion

12

Petitioners note that if the law were other than that set out in Cottonwood Mall, courts
would end up in the business of making contracts for parties. For example, litigants could ask
for a determination of the price of a BMW that a car dealer had agreed to sell at a "reasonable
price" and for which a purchaser had agreed to pay a "reasonable price." Based upon a contract
in which the parties, after lengthy negotiation, had agreed upon the color, make, year and model
of the vehicle, one party to the contract could ask the court to determine the "reasonable price"
and then enforce the contract. Cottonwood Mall makes it clear that courts should decline such
invitations to make or enforce an agreement when the parties themselves have failed.
-13«

in Cottonwood Mall and reconsider its decision in this regard. Petitioners request the Court to
affirm the trial court's dismissal of the breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing claims.
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of September, 1994.
By their signatures below, counsel for Respondents hereby certify that this petition for
rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

Richard A. Rappaport
Leslie Van Frank
Attorneys for Respondents
Jay & Ron Smart
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES

ghwo^^
Jdlffre/ W. Jones
Paul M. Durham
Attorneys for Respondent
Won-Door Corp.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the 3>6 day of September, 1994, to each of the following:
Richard K* Crandall, Esq.
925 East Executive Park, Suite D
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Robert G. Norton, Esq.
7105 So. Highland Drive, #210
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

(lvf\wondor.pet)

-15-

APPENDIX I

l

/I

,

-

HI

< Gh^QaLAt* * J (X.c.^0 (res:
|;
•«

!!

?-e-e_ ^ - ^
fe)

jn4^e^>}-

u*

UJ < r r x _ bocH #

s-3 llcnxss ,
of-

tfjL.

frrxi

I vtlltovi.

< ^ f)(P»ciL^:l n n > ~ \

(

J

(£) ^'A

liJ

I"
j!,

S~%

an

(J)

3'/.

*#

«}

V

K ^ * w f

^

*wf

I

>M,//,c*

/

TH;//^

°f

I'

yourzAtUJC

f^-JLati

/>

[vuu,

0*>U;

oc^

--'lli^.

^

Exhibit—Z—

A*

000021Q

r- i-•^. J

\j

•_ 4 j r ^

__« ' ^ *" _ * _^ *• •

•

•*

•

* „*•

»•>*--

^ *• P~w

May 21 f 1986

Reed A. Watkins
Watkins & Faber
2102 E. 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

S4109

Dear Reed,
This letter serves as fonral nocice to you of our list of prospective
buyers for the Won Dcor Corporation,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Wcs Kay Corp.
Capital Consultants Inc.
The Republic Croup
The Dallas Corp.
Leucadia Inc.
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August 20, 1986

Reed A. Watkins, Esq.
Watkins & Faber
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
RE:

The Republic Group/Won-Door

Dear Mr. Watkins:
I am writing in confirmation of our telephone
conversation of last week and your assurance that you
recognized your obligation to The Republic Group if Leucadia or
any of the other qualified ten listed companies acquires an
interest in Won-Door.
I have reviewed the documents and this matter with Irv
Bird and after confirmation with you, my undertanding is that:
If one of the qualified companies, including Leucadia,
purchases an interest in Won-Door, The Republic Group
is entitled to a commission. The commission is based
on a fee of $250,000 per 22% of Won-Door purchased,
thus if 100% of Won-Door is purchased by one of the
qualified corporations then The Republic Group should
be entitled to a $1,000,000 fee.
If that does not comport with your understanding I would
appreciate hearing immediately so that I can discuss this
matter with my client.
My understanding is that Leucadia has been negotiating
very seriously with Won-Door and that last week after examining
the books they made an offer. If this offer is accepted The
Republic Group would be entitled to its fees.
*
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Reed A. Watkins, Esq.
Page 2
August 20, 1986
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will
assure my client that there is no misunderstanding on the
agreement.

DJP:cc
0008p

APPENDIX n

CERTIFIED COPY
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * *

THE REPUBLIC GROUP, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

)
)
WON-DOOR CORPORATION, a Utah )
corporation, REED A. WATKINS,)
JAY A. SMART, RON SMART, and )
DOES 1 through 20,
)

Civil No. C88-3902

vs.

Defendants.

Deposition of:
IRVIN D. BIRD, JR.
VOLUME I

)

Deposition of IRVIN D. BIRD, JR., taken at the
instance and request of the Defendants, at the law offices
of Walter P. Faber, Jr., 2102 East 3300 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, on Wednesday, the 10th day of August, 1988, at
the hour of 10:10 a.m., before VICKY MCDANIEL, a Certified
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, Utah License No. 285.
* * *
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under that paragraph, under this effort for the seven
million, but there were some of them—
Q

Did you ever make a written l i s t —

A

No.

Q

— o f those names?

A

No, not under this segment.

I think we have to

clarify the fact that we determined at The Republic Group in
our discussions in-house that a $7 million private placement
in a private corporation in a minority interest could not be
accompli shed.

Unfortunately, I can't remember the names of

several people that we talked to Reed about that, but at the
time we talked to them we told them that in our opinion a
minorityr interest in a privately owned corporation we could
not fund1.

Q

Okay.

Now, your opinion, that is, The Republic

Group's?
A

Republic Group's opinion, yeah.

g o t — w e ' d have to talk to Mr. Watkins.

Now, we have

We talked to not a

great number of people under this arrangement.

Q

Over what period of time did you talk to those

people?
{Witness consults with counsel off the record.)
MR. WILKINS:

Did you hear the question?

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

During the period—our first

contact was around the last part of February and coming into

16

1
2
3
4

March of 1986.
Q

(By Mr. Faber)

And that would be prior to the

March 12th, '86 letter?
A

That would be up to—I'd say well into April,

5

maybe into May that we determined that we couldn't really

6

exclusively get a private investment there—investor.

7

Q

So Republic Group started at the latter part of

8

February '86 and then well up into May before The Republic

9

Group determined that it couldn't get an investor for the 2

10

percent?

11

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

12

Q

Now, during that period did The Republic G r o u p —

13

can you recall any names that you talked to Mr. Watkins

14

about in reference to Exhibit 1?

15

A

There are a number of names.

I think we talked

16

to him about Richard Peery in Palo Alto, private investor.

17

He's a large investor.

18

Q

Was he a sole proprietorship or a corporation?

19

A

He's a sole proprietorship.

20

developer.

21

Q

Richard Peery?

22

A

Yeah.

23

Q

How do you spell,Peery?

24

A

P-e-e-r-y.

25

Q

Two double e's and r-y?

He's a real estate

17

1

A

Uh-huh, e-e-r-y.

2

Q

In Palo Alto?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Do you have his address?

5

A

No, but I could supply it to you.

6

Q

All right.

7

A

I'd have to talk with Reed and get those names.

Who else?

8

We talked to a number of people that we talked 1to Reed about

9

those specifically, but I can't recall exactly \rfhat they
I could meet with my other associates; they kept

10

were.

11

better notes than I did, and they would have to supply that

12

to you.

13
14

Q

I don't know that at this moment.
But your associates would have notes other than

the documents you've furnished us today?

15

A

They might have.

16

Q

Did you inquire of them whether they had such

17
18

I don't know.

documents so that you might bring them today?
A

No.

I brought all the documents we had.

Our

19

activity mainly changed from this emphasis very shortly

20

after thi s to finding a full merger partner.

21

Q

Would that have been in May when that happened?

22

A

That would have been in April, starting in April.

23

Reed and I had a number of meetings during this period of

24

January, February, March, April relating to this almost on a

25

daily basis, as a matter of fact, and I made it known to him

[

18

that it was our opinion that The Republic Group, that an
investment of this kind in a private corporation was just an
impo.ssible thing to do.
Q

When do you recall telling him that for the first

time ?
A

It would have been even during the time, m a y b e —

Marc]ti 6th, I have a note that you have a photocopy of of a
meet ing I held on March 6th at my office with Reed where we
went over the financials.

I suspect we discussed it about

that time .
Q

So you told him prior to Exhibit 1 that you

di-dn • t <think that t h e —
A

I said it looked difficult at this time.

Q

— t h e proposed sale of 22 percent iwould be very

hard to do ?
A

Yeah, looked like a difficult situation at that

time •
Q

Now, you're looking at some notes.

Are those

your private notes there?
A

They're just a list of some of the meetings and

the <discussions that were held.
Q

When did you compile those notes?

A

Last night.

Q

What did you look at to determine 1the dates that

you ]put on those notes?

19

A

Well, I went through this sheath of papers that

you have, and it says a note of a meeting the 6th of March
with Reed Watkins, discussed financials, put that down.

At

8:30 the morning of March 6th I had a meeting with Watkins,
see the list of the company strengths—he listed for us that
day the company strengths, why Won-Door would be a good
merger partner or a good candidate for someone to make an
investment.
Q

You have no objection to our making a copy of

your notes?
A

None whatever-

They're just very sketchy.

Q

Now, Mr. Bird, calling your attention again to

the last sentence of Exhibit 1, there is a portion of the
sentence there that says, "to avoid misunderstanding
regarding contacts."

Was there discussion with Mr. Watkins

as to avoiding misunderstanding?
A

Not particularly.

very obsolete.

In fact, this document became

This was a document where we defined a 22

percent investor in Won-Door for which we were to be paid
$250,000.

This document became obsolete when it was

determined that Won-Door would entertain a sale for the
entire corporation, and at that point we no longer worked on
this document except that we figured that if we raised $7
million for $250,000, if we sold the company for $30 million
it ought to be maybe five times that.

21

in in May who might have been able to perform this.
to that we were working in April.

Prior

We went through an

exercise, The Republic Group, and it was determined for Mr.
Watkins that the whole corporation would be sold.

We did an

exercise where we examined every company on the Standard and
Poors to locate a purchaser or a merger partner for
Won-Door.
Q

You said you brought someone in April or May to

Mr. Watkins that would perform the formula or buy that
smaller percentage of Won-Door.
A

Who was that?

Mr. James Volker, and that was well after we were

into merger discussions with othersspecifically asked him.

I call-ed Reed and

I said, Reed, I know we're not

working under this deal any more.

I know—

Q

By that you mean Exhibit 1?

A

Selling 22 percent as defined in Exhibit 1, that

we were now looking for a full merger partner.
Q

When did you talk to Mr. Watkins about that?

A

I'm not—exact date, I can find that for you.

Mr. Watkins came to The Republic Group and met with us when
Mr. Volker came to town after I had asked Feed's permission
to have him come.

I said, Are you still interested in a 22

percent arrangement?

We know we're working on the sale of

the whole company and I know we have certain arrangements
with Boettchers—you do, and you have certain names for us;

22

do you or do you not want me to have Mr. Volker come to
town?

Mr. Watkins said, I do want him to come to town.
He came to town and we discussed an arrangement

under Exhibit 1 with Mr. Volker.

It's the only activity we

had under Exhibit 1 after it was determined the whole
corporation was going to be sold.

Q

When was it determined that the whole corporation

was going to be sold?

A

I suspect we started working on it in April

because I have certain notes where we met with Leucadia
Corporation in March and April, May, and others.

It's at

that period that we started our solicitation and talked with
Reed about companies we were going to make contact with on
the American and the New York Stock Exchange.

Q

Who were those companies that you made contact

A

We have a list of those in our complaint, Exhibit

with?

B or whatever it is.

I guess the better way to answer your

question is, I submitted to you a list of Standard and Poors
companies;• we highlighted certain ones that in our opinion
would be interested in the purchase of Won-Door, and we
discussed those on a daily basis with Mr. Watkins, who we
were seeing.

Q

Was that purchase of the entire Won-Door or only

a portion of t h e —

65

he's say nothing, and I'd say, I called Leucadia; they said
that the following things happened: we discussed this, this,
this, and this.

Then I was damn sure I was out of the loop.

So at a meeting on the 20th of August my partners
Bryant Cragun—my associates, not partners—my associates,
Mark McSwain, Fred Volcansek, all drafted letters to be
written.

And T thought they were all too harsh, so I asked

Mr. Doug Parry to write a letter saying that we knew that
tomorrow or the next day there was going to be an offer made
for cash and we had no fee agreement; and we demanded,
absolutely demanded a fee agreement or we would make sure
that the offer wasn't forthcoming, and we'd had that
discussion with Leucadia.

And so this letter was written in

an attempt to get some kind of a comprehensive agreement
together listing all of the companies that we had brought.
Q

Now, you mentioned that this was the second

letter that you'd asked Mr. Parry to write.

Did he in fact

write a prior letter?
A

He did.

I don't have a copy of it, but it's my

understanding that he did write a letter.

I know that Reed

called him and had some discussions after.
Q

I haven't seen such a letter, Mr. Bird, so if you

find it will you supply us a copy of that?
A

Yes, I will.

Q

All right.

But the prior letter that you were

79

A

I don't know.

I didn't write the letter.

That

wouldn't have been my wording.
Q

Okay.

But in any case, had you looked at this

letter at the time Mr. Parry sent it you would have changed
it?
A

Uh-huh.

I probably would have said the fee

should be five million.

No.

Q

But you would have changed it?

A

I would have changed it, yes.

I would have made

it more inclusive.
(Whereupon, Exhibit 6
was marked
for identification.)
Q

(By Mr. Faber)

Now, Mr. Bird, I show you what's

been marked as Exhibit 6 to this deposition, which appears
to be a handwritten agreement dated August 22nd, '86; and
attached to it is a copy of the letter of May 21st.. '86 to
Mr. Watkins.

Can you identify this document-?

A

Yes, I've seen the document.

Q

When did you first see it?

A

I was present when Mr. Watkins wrote it.

Q

On August 22nd, 19«6?

A

Uh-huh, at the office of The Republic Group at

185 South State.
Q

Okay.

Now, I note that this agreement is dated

two days after Exhibit 5, which is Mr. Parry's letter to Mr.

81

Inc.
A

That's correct.

Q

Okay,

And that would be the same

Leucadia that's

mentioned in Mr. Parry's letter, Exhibit 5?
A

Uh-huh-

Q

Would you answer—

A

Yes.

Q

Now, this document goes on to state, "Re fee due

former-

f<mm

M

I'm sorry.

*nd that's The Republic Group; that's as you

understand it, right?
A

Yes.

Q

"If Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten

listed companies) aquires an interest in Won-Door," right?
A

That's correct.

Q

Okay, and Leucadia and the other qualified ten

listed companies are those ones listed on the second page,
right?
A

They are.

Q

Now, then there is a listing A, B, C, D, E of the

formulaL for a fee on the first page of Exhibit 6, and as I
understand your prior testimony, that would be the Lehman
formula1/

C orrect?

A

That's correct.

Q

So on August 22nd, '86 Reed storms into your

office and he writes out- the first page of Exhibit 6?
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Michael J. Wilkins (Bar No. 3470)
TIBBALS, HOWELL & MOXLEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Two Fifty Seven Towers, Suite 850
257 East 200 South-2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2048
Telephone: (801) 531-7 575
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

^J>

S T A T E OF

UTAH

\

THE REPUBLIC GROUP, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

vs.
WON-DOOR CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
REED A. WATKINS,
JAY A. SMART, RON SMART, and
DOES 1 THROUGH 20,
Defendants.

ivil No.
Civ

Judge

Plaintiff complains of the defendants and alleges as
follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of
business in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the acts complained of herein
all occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah.

0 P n r* r o

include authorization for plaintiff to present to its contacts the
invitation to buy Won-Door Corporation at a sale price of $32-$35
million, and further agreed to pay plaintiff a reasonable fee in
the event one of its contacts actually closed such a purchase of
Won-Door Corporation.
12.

Immediately thereafter, plaintiff requested defen-

dant Watkins reduce the modified fee arrangement to writing, which
defendant Watkins initially refused to do, telling Bird that he did
not need a contract in writing inasmuch as they were old friends,
and Watkins would see that plaintiff was fully compensated.
13.

Immediately

thereafter, plaintiff

set about to

market Won-Door Corporation by the presentation of a written
marketing brochure and the preparation of a descriptive video tape
which it proceeded to introduce to more than 2 0 prospective buyers
believed to be financially able to make the acquisition.
14.

During the period of marketing, defendant Watkins

was in daily contact with plaintiff, encouraging the marketing
efforts, and seeking information about potential buyers.
15.

By mid-May, 1986, plaintiff had caused Won-Door

Corporation's

sales proposition to be presented to 2 0 to 30

companies, including Thermal Systems, Inc. ("TSI") and Leucadia
National Corporation ("Leucadia").

4
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for $35,000,000 cash, which offer was ultimately rejected by WonDoor Corporation.
22.

Leucadia was ready, willing and able to close the

sale for $35,000,000 cash at the time it was rejected by defendants .
23.

During the summer months of 1986, having received

the Won-Door Corporation proposal and information from plaintiff,
agents of TSI contacted defendant Watkins directly and commenced
negotiations for the acquisition of Won-Door Corporation.
24.
1986,

after

insistence

Watkins met with plaintiff on or about August 22,
negotiations

of defendants

with

TSI

reduced

had

the

commenced,

Finder

and

at

Fee Agreement

the
to

writing, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and
incorporated herein by this reference.
25.

At the time the Agreement dated August 22, 1986 was

drafted by Watkins, Watkins knew that he was engaged in serious
merger negotiations with TSI and that TSI had been introduced to
Won-Door Corporation through the efforts of plaintiff.
26.

At the time of drafting the Agreement of August 22,

1986, Watkins did not disclose to plaintiff that negotiations with
TSI had commenced, and in fact refused to discuss TSI, suggesting
they be removed from the list of potential buyers as an unfruitful
prospect.
6

000

27.
introduction

On August 22, 1986, plaintiff was unaware that its
of Won-Door Corporation to TSI had

resulted in

negotiations, and in reliance upon the representations of Watkins
and in ignorance of the true situation relating to TSI, executed
the second Fee Agreement excluding TSI from the list of qualified
companies upon which it would be entitled to a finders fee in the
event of a successful sale.
28.

Thereafter, on October 27, 1986, plaintiff became

aware for the first time that a merger between TSI and Won-Door
Corporation had been agreed to, when it was announced to the
public.
29.

On October

27, 1986, Bird

contacted

defendant

Watkins to congratulate him on the conclusion of a merger transaction, and to request the agreed fee.
30.

Defendant Watkins refused and continues to refuse,

for himself and on behalf of the other defendants, to pay the fee
agreed

between

the

parties

for the TSI/Won-Door

Corporation

transaction.
31.

As his own fee for the transaction, defendant

Watkins personally received the value of approximately $2,627,000.
32.

Defendants Smart and Doe received $15,000,000 cash,

plus 1.5 million shares of TSI stock, which was valued at the date

7
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APPENDIX IV

WALTER P. FABER, JR. (A1026)
Attorney for Defendant Watkins
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Telephone: 486-5634

i,
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE "
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE REPUBLIC GROUP, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

]
)'
*
)
>

AFFIDAVIT OF REED A. WATKINS
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF f S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]

VSo

WON-DOOR CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, REED A. WATKINS,
JAY Ao SMART, RON SMART, and
DOES 1 THROUGH 20,

)

Civil No. C88-3902

])

JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
REED A. WATKINS, being first duly sworn of his own

knowledge, states as follows:

1.

Affidavit is over the age of twenty-one and is a

residence of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Early in 1986, I was authorized as an agent of Won-Door

and its shareholders to find funding through an initial public
offering or a private placement of stock.

Pursuant to this

authority I contacted several companies and individuals who might
assist in finding a buyer.
3.

Among those contacted was Irvin D. Bird, Jr. ("Bird"),

president of The Republic Group ("Republic"), who, after
reviewing and discussing the promotional materials I gave him,

^ ^ <-' ^ u i

(c)

Other than the exceptions, the contract with Boettcher

was exclusive.

We discussed that if a sale were made to one of

Republic's exceptions, a Lehman formula commission would be paid
to Republic and no commission would be paid Boettcher.

On the

other hand, upon a sale of Won-Door to anyone else, Boettcher
would be entitled to a commission and no commission would be
payable to Republic.
13.

Thereafter on May 21, 1986, I received Republic's list

of exceptions and gave a copy to Boettcher.
14.

Republic's May 21, 1986 list actually contained eleven

names instead of ten.

However, Boettcher agreed that the

companies on that list would be excepted from the Boettcher
agreement.
15.

Boettcher had also requested that Republic provide a

list of any other prospective buyers for Won-Door to whom Bird or
Republic had sent promotional materials concerning Won-Door.

I

explained that Boettcher did not want to send information and
promotional materials to any company which had previously
received material on Won-Door from Republic.
16.

Pursuant to this request, Bird then gave me the

handwritten list of May 27, 1986, a copy of which I gave to
Boettcher.
17.

Mr. Bird's May 27, 1986 list contained the name

"Thermal Systems, Inc."
in October, 1986.

Won-Door was sold to TS Industries, Inc.

Thermal Systems, Inc. is a subsidiary of TS
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